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Abstract
We conducted an empirical analysis into the
relation between control and discourse struc-
ture. We applied control criteria to four di-
alogues and identified 3 levels of discourse
structure. We investigated the mechanism for
changing control between these structures and
found that utterance type and not cue words
predicted shifts of control. Participants used
certain types of signals when discourse goals
were proceeding successfully but resorted to
interruptions when they were not.
1 Introduction
A number of researchers have shown that there
is organisation in discourse above the level of
the individual utterance (5, 8, 9, 10), The cur-
rent exploratory study uses control as a pa-
rameter for identifying these higher level struc-
tures. We then go on to address how conversa-
tional participants co-ordinate moves between
these higher level units, in particular looking
at the ways they use to signal the beginning
and end of such high level units.
Previous research has identified three means
by which speakers signal information about
discourse structure to listeners: Cue words
and phrases (5, 10); Intonation (7); Pronomi-
nalisation (6, 2). In the cue words approach,
Reichman (10) has claimed that phrases like
“because”, “so”, and “but” offer explicit in-
formation to listeners about how the speaker’s
current contribution to the discourse relates
to what has gone previously. For example a
speaker might use the expression “so” to signal
that s/he is about to conclude what s/he has
just said. Grosz and Sidner (5) relate the use
of such phrases to changes in attentional state.
An example would be that “and” or “but” sig-
nal to the listener that a new topic and set
of referents is being introduced whereas “any-
way” and “in any case” indicate a return to a
previous topic and referent set. A second in-
direct way of signalling discourse structure is
intonation. Hirschberg and Pierrehumbert (7)
showed that intonational contour is closely re-
lated to discourse segmentation with new top-
ics being signalled by changes in intonational
contour. A final more indirect cue to discourse
structure is the speaker’s choice of referring ex-
pressions and grammatical structure. A num-
ber of researchers (4, 2, 6, 10) have given ac-
counts of how these relate to the continuing,
retaining or shifting of focus.
The above approaches have concentrated on
particular surface linguistic phenomena and
then investigated what a putative cue serves to
signal in a number of dialogues. The problem
with this approach is that the cue may only be
an infrequent indicator of a particular type of
shift. If we want to construct a general theory
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of discourse than we want to know about the
whole range of cues serving this function. This
study therefore takes a different approach. We
begin by identifying all shifts of control in the
dialogue and then look at how each shift was
signalled by the speakers. A second problem
with previous research is that the criteria for
identifying discourse structure are not always
made explicit. In this study explicit criteria
are given: we then go on to analyse the rela-
tion between cues and this structure.
2 The data
The data were recordings of telephone conver-
sations between clients and an expert concern-
ing problems with software. The tape record-
ings from four dialogues were then transcribed
and the analysis conducted on the typewrit-
ten transcripts rather than the raw recordings.
There was a total of 450 turns in the dialogues.
2.1 Criteria for classifying utterance
types. Each utterance in the dialogue was
classified into one of four categories: (a) As-
sertions - declarative utterances which were
used to state facts. Yes or no answers to ques-
tions were also classified as assertions on the
grounds that they were supplying the listener
with factual information; (b) Commands -
utterances which were intended to instigate
action in their audience. These included vari-
ous utterances which did not have imperative
form, (e.g. “What I would do if I were you
is to relink X”) but were intended to induce
some action; (c)Questions - utterances which
were intended to elicit information from the
audience. These included utterances which
did not have interrogative form. e.g. “So
my question is....” They also included para-
phrases, in which the speaker reformulated or
repeated part or all of what had just been said.
Paraphrases were classified as questions on the
grounds that the effect was to induce the lis-
tener to confirm or deny what had just been
stated; (d) Prompts - These were utterances
which did not express propositional content.
Examples of prompts were things like “Yes”
and “Uhu”.
2.2 Allocation of control in the dia-
logues. We devised several rules to determine
the location of control in the dialogues. Each
of these rules related control to utterance type:
(a) For questions, the speaker was defined as
being in control unless the question directly
followed a question or command by the other
conversant. The reason for this is that ques-
tions uttered following questions or commands
are normally attempts to clarify the preceding
utterance and as such are elicited by the previ-
ous speaker’s utterance rather than directing
the conversation in their own right. (b) For
assertions, the speaker was defined as being in
control unless the assertion was made in re-
sponse to a question, for the same reasons as
those given for questions; an assertion which
is a response to a question could not be said
to be controlling the discourse; (c) For com-
mands, the speaker was defined as controlling
the conversation. Indirect commands (i.e. ut-
terances which did not have imperative form
but served to elicit some actions) were also
classified in this way; (d) For prompts, the
listener was defined as controlling the conver-
sation, as the speaker was clearly abdicating
his/her turn. In cases where a turn consisted
of several utterances, the control rules were
only applied to the final utterance.
We applied the control rules and found
that control did not alternate from speaker to
speaker on a turn by turn basis, but that there
were long sequences of turns in which con-
trol remained with one speaker. This seemed
to suggest that the dialogues were organised
above the level of individual turns into phases
where control was located with one speaker.
The mean number of turns in each phase was
8.03.
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3 Mechanisms for switch-
ing control
We then went on to analyse how control was
exchanged between participants at the bound-
aries of these phases. We first examined the
last utterance of each phase on the grounds
that one mechanism for indicating the end of
a phase would be for the speaker controlling
the phase to give some cue that he (both par-
ticipants in the dialogues were always male) no
longer wished to control the discourse. There
was a total of 56 shifts of control over the 4
dialogues and we identified 3 main classes of
cues used to signal control shifts These were
prompts, repetitions and summaries. We also
looked at when no signal was given (interrup-
tions).
3.1 Prompts. On 21 of the 56 shifts (38%),
the utterance immediately prior to the con-
trol shift was a prompt. We might therefore
explain these shifts as resulting from the per-
son in control explicitly indicating that he had
nothing more to say.
(In the following examples a line indicates a
control shift)
Example 1 - Prompt Dialogue C -
1. E: ”And they are, in your gen
you’ll find that they’ve relocated into
the labelled common area” (E con-
trol)
2. C: ”That’s right.” (E control)
3. E: ”Yeah” (E abdicates control
with prompt)
—————————–
4. C: ”I’ve got two in there. There
are two of them.” (C control)
5. E: ”Right” (C control)
6. C: ”And there’s another one which
is % RESA” (C control)
7. E: ”OK um” (C control)
8. C: ”VS” (C control)
9. E: ”Right” (C control)
10. C: ”Mm” (C abdicates control
with prompt)
—————————-
11. E: ”Right and you haven’t got
- I assume you haven’t got local la-
belled common with those labels” (E
control)
3.2 Repetitions and summaries. On a
further 15 occasions (27%), we found that the
person in control of the dialogue signalled that
they had no new information to offer. They
did this either by repeating what had just been
said (6 occasions), or by giving a summary of
what they had said in the preceding utterances
of the phase (9 occasions). We defined a rep-
etition as an assertion which expresses part or
all of the propositional content of a previous
assertion but which contains no new informa-
tion. A summary consisted of concise reference
to the entire set of information given about the
client’s problem or the solution plan.
Example 2 - Repetition. Dialogue C -
1. Client: ”These routines are filed
as DS” (C control)
2. Expert: ”That’s right, yes” (C
control)
3. C: ”DS” (C abdicates control with
repetition)
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——————————–
4. E: ”And they are, in your gen
you’ll find they’ve relocated
into your local common area.” (E
control)
Half the repetitions were accompanied by
cue words. These were “and”, “well” and “so”,
which prefixed the assertion.
Example 3 - Summary Dialogue B -
1. E. ”OK. Initialise the disc retain-
ing spares” (E control)
2. C: ”Right” (E control)
3. E: ”Uh and then TF it back” (E
control)
4. C: ”Right” (E control)
5. E: ”Did you do the TF with ver-
ify?” (E control)
6. C: ”Er yes I did” (E control)
7. E: ”OK. That would be my recom-
mendation and that will ensure that
you get er a logically integral set of
files” (E abdicates control with sum-
mary)
——————————-
8. C: ”Right. You think that initial-
ising it using this um EXER facility.”
(C control)
What are the linguistic characteristics of
summaries? Reichman (10) suggests that “so”
might be a summary cue on the part of the
speaker but we found only one example of this,
although there were 3 instances of “and”, one
“now” one “but” and one “so”. In our di-
alogues the summaries seemed to be charac-
terised by the concise reference to objects or
entities which had earlier been described in de-
tail, e.g. (a) “Now, I’m wondering how the two
are related” in which “the two” refers to the
two error messages which it had taken several
utterances to describe previously. The other
characteristic of summaries is that they con-
trast strongly with the extremely concrete de-
scriptions elsewhere in the dialogues, e.g. “err
the system program standard call file doesn’t
complete this means that the file does not have
a tail record” followed by “And I’ve no clue at
all how to get out of the situation”. Exam-
ple 3 also illustrates this change from specific
(1, 3, 5) to general (7). How then do rep-
etitions and summaries operate as cues? In
summarising, the speaker is indicating a nat-
ural breakpoint in the dialogue and they also
indicate that they have nothing more to add
at that stage. Repetitions seem to work in a
similar way: the fact that a speaker reiterates
indicates that he has nothing more to say on
a topic.
3.3 Interruptions. In the previous cases,
the person controlling the dialogue gave a sig-
nal that control might be exchanged. There
were 20 further occasions (36% of shifts) on
which no such indication is given. We there-
fore went on to analyse the conditions in which
such interruptions occurred. These seem to
fall into 3 categories: (a) vital facts; (b) re-
sponses to vital facts; (c) clarifications.
3.3.1 Vital facts. On a total of 6 occasions
(11% of shifts) the client interrupted to con-
tradict the speaker or to supply what seemed
to be relevant information that he believed the
expert did not know.
Example 4 Dialogue C -
1. E: ”.... and it generates this warn-
ing, which is now at 4.0 to warn you
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about the situation” (E control)
———————————
2. C: ”It is something new though
um” (C assumes control by interrup-
tion)
3. E: ”Well” (C control)
4. C: ”The programs that I’ve run
before obviously LINK A’s got some
new features in it which er...” (C con-
trol)
———————————
5. E: ”That’s right, it’s a new warn-
ing at 4.0” (E assumes control by in-
terruption)
Two of these 6 interjections were to supply ex-
tra information and one was marked with the
cue “as well”. The other four were to con-
tradict what had just been said and two had
explicit markers “though” and “well actually”:
the remaining two being direct denials.
3.3.2 Reversions of control following
vital facts. The next class of interruptions
occur after the client has made some interjec-
tion to supply a missing fact or when the client
has blocked a plan or rejected an explanation
that the expert has produced. There were 8
such occasions (14% of shifts).
The interruption in the previous example il-
lustrates the reversion of control to the expert
after the client has supplied information which
he (the client) believes to be highly relevant
to the expert. In the following example, the
client is already in control.
Example 5 Dialogue B -
1. ”I’ll take a backup first as you say”
(C control)
2. E: ”OK” (C control)
3. C: ”The trouble is that it takes a
long time doing all this” (C control)
————————————
4. E: ”Yeah, yeah but er this kind
of thing there’s no point taking any
short cuts or you could end up with
no system at all.” (E assumes control
by interruption)
On five occasions the expert explic-
itly signified his acceptance or re-
jection of what the client had said,
e.g.“Ah”,“Right indeed”,“that’s
right”,“No”,“Yeah but”. On three
occasions there were no markers.
3.3.3 Clarifications. Participants can also
interrupt to clarify what has just been said.
This happened on 6 occasions (11%) of shifts.
Example 6 Dialogue C -
1. C: ”If I put an SE in and then do
an EN it comes up” (C control)
———————————-
2. E: ”So if you put in a ...?” ( E
control)
3. C: ”SE” (E control)
On two occasions clarifications were prefixed
by “now” and twice by “so”. On the final two
occasions there was no such marker, and a di-
rect question was used.
3.3.4 An explanation of interruptions.
We have just described the circumstances in
which interruptions occur, but can we now ex-
plain why they occur? We suggest the follow-
ing two principles might account for interrup-
tions: these principles concern: (a) the infor-
mation upon which the participants are basing
their plans, and (b) the plans themselves.
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(A). Information quality: Both expert
and client must believe that the informa-
tion that the expert has about the prob-
lem is true and that this information is
sufficient to solve the problem. This can
be expressed by the following two rules
which concern the truth of the informa-
tion and the ambiguity of the information:
(A1) if the listener believes a fact P and
believes that fact to be relevant and either
believes that the speaker believes not P or
that the speaker does not know P then in-
terrupt; (A2) If the listener believes that
the speaker’s assertion is relevant but am-
biguous then interrupt.
(B). Plan quality: Both expert and client
must believe that the plan that the ex-
pert has generated is adequate to solve
the problem and it must be comprehensi-
ble to the client. The two rules which ex-
press this principle concern the effective-
ness of the plan and the ambiguity of the
plan: (B1) If the listener believes P and
either believes that P presents an obstacle
to the proposed plan or believes that part
of the proposed plan has already been sat-
isfied, then interrupt; (B2) If the listener
believes that an assertion about the pro-
posed plan is ambiguous, then interrupt.
In this framework, interruptions can be seen
as strategies produced by either conversational
participant when they perceive that a either
principle is not being adhered to.
3.4 Cue reliability. We also investigated
whether there were occasions when prompts,
repetitions and summaries failed to elicit the
control shifts we predicted. We considered two
possible types of failure: either the speaker
could give a cue and continue or the speaker
could give a cue and the listener fail to re-
spond. We found no instances of the first
case; although speakers did produce phrases
like “OK” and then continue, the “OK” was
always part of the same intonational contour
as that further information and there was no
break between the two, suggesting the phrase
was a prefix and not a cue. We did, how-
ever, find instances of the second case: twice
following prompts and once following a sum-
mary, there was a long pause, indicating that
the speaker was not ready to respond. We
conducted a similar analysis for those cue
words that have been identified in the liter-
ature. Only 21 of the 35 repetitions, sum-
maries and interruptions had cue words asso-
ciated with them and there were also 19 in-
stances of the cue words “now”, “and”, “so”,
“but” and “well” occurring without a control
shift.
4 Control cues and global
control
The analysis so far has been concerned with
control shifts where shifts were identified from
a series of rules which related utterance type
and control. Examination of the dialogues
indicated that there seemed to be different
types of control shifts: after some shifts there
seemed to be a change of topic, whereas for
others the topic remained the same. We next
went on to examine the relationship between
topic shift and the different types of cues and
interruptions described earlier. To do this it
was necessary first to classify control shifts ac-
cording to whether they resulted in shifts of
topic.
4.1 Identifying topic shifts. We iden-
tified topic shifts in the following way: Five
judges were presented with the four dialogues
and in each of the dialogues we had marked
where control shifts occurred. The judges were
asked to state for each control shift whether
it was accompanied by a topic shift. All five
judges agreed on 24 of the 56 shifts, and 4
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agreed for another 22 of the shifts. Where
there was disagreement, the majority judg-
ment was taken.
4.2 Topic shift and type of control
shift. Analysing each type of control shift,
it is clear that there are differences between
the cues used for the topic shift and the
no shift cases. For interruptions, 90% oc-
cur within topic, i.e. they do not result in
topic shifts. The pattern is not as obvious for
prompts and repetitions/summaries, with 57%
of prompts occurring within topic and 67% of
repetitions/summaries occurring within topic.
This suggests that change of topic is a care-
fully negotiated process. The controlling par-
ticipant signals that he is ready to close the
topic by producing either a prompt or a rep-
etition/summary and this may or may not be
accepted by the other participant. What is
apparent is that it is highly unusual for a
participant to seize control and change topic
by interruption. It seems that on the ma-
jority of occasions (63%) participants wait for
the strongest possible cue (the prompt) before
changing topic.
4.3 Other relations between topic and
control. We also looked at more general
aspects of control within and between top-
ics. We investigated the number of utterances
for which each participant was in control and
found that there seemed to be organisation
in the dialogues above the level of topic. We
found that each dialogue could be divided into
two parts separated by a topic shift which we
labelled the central shift. The two parts of
the dialogue were very different in terms of
who controlled and initiated each topic. Be-
fore the central shift, the client had control
for more turns per topic and after it, the ex-
pert had control for more turns per topic.
The respective numbers of turns client and ex-
pert are in control before and after the central
shift are :Before 11-7,22-8,12-6,21-6; After 12-
33,16-23,2-11,0-5 for the four dialogues. With
the exception of the first topic in Dialogues 1
and 4, the client has control of more turns in
every topic before the central shift, whereas af-
ter it, the expert has control for more turns in
every topic. In addition we looked at who ini-
tiated each topic, i.e. who produced the first
utterance of each topic. We found that in each
dialogue, the client initiates all the topics be-
fore the central shift, whereas the expert initi-
ates the later ones. We also discovered a close
relationship between topic initiation and topic
dominance. In 19 of the 21 topics, the per-
son who initiated the topic also had control of
more turns. As we might expect, the point at
which the expert begins to have control over
more turns per topic is also the point at which
the expert begins to initiate new topics.
5 Conclusions
The main result of this exploratory study is
the finding that control is a useful parameter
for identifying discourse structure. Using this
parameter we identified three levels of struc-
ture in the dialogues: (a) control phases; (b)
topic; and (c) global organisation. For the con-
trol phases, we found that three types of utter-
ances (prompts, repetitions and summaries)
were consistently used to signal control shifts.
For the low level structures we identified, (i.e.
control phases), cue words and phrases were
not as reliable in predicting shifts. This re-
sult challenges the claims of recent discourse
theories (5, 10) which argue for a the close re-
lation between cue words and discourse struc-
ture. We also examined how utterance type
related to topic shift and found that few inter-
ruptions introduced a new topic. Finally there
was evidence for high level structures in these
dialogues as evidenced by topic initiation and
control, with early topics being initiated and
dominated by the client and the opposite be-
ing true for the later parts.
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Another focus of current research has been
the modelling of speaker and listener goals (1,
3) but there has been little research on real
dialogues investigating how goals are commu-
nicated and inferred. This study identifies
surface linguistic phenomena which reflect the
fact that participants are continuously moni-
toring their goals. When plans are perceived
as succeeding, participants use explicit cues
such as prompts, repetitions and summaries
to signal their readiness to move to the next
stage of the plan. In other cases, where partic-
ipants perceive obstacles to their goals being
achieved, they resort to interruptions and we
have tried to make explicit the rules by which
they do this.
In addition our methodology is different
from other studies because we have attempted
to provide an explanation for whole dialogues
rather than fragments of dialogues, and used
explicit criteria in a bottom-up manner to
identify discourse structures. The number of
dialogues was small and taken from a single
problem domain. It seems likely therefore that
some of our findings (e.g the central shift) will
be specific to the diagnostic dialogues we stud-
ied. Further research applying the same tech-
niques to a broader set of data should establish
the generality of the control rules suggested
here.
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